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Background: There appears to be an inconsistency in experimental paradigms used in fMRI research on moral
judgments. As stimuli, moral dilemmas or moral statements/ pictures that induce emotional reactions are usually
employed; a main difference between these stimuli is the perspective of the participants reflecting first-person (moral
dilemmas) or third-person perspective (moral reactions). The present study employed functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) in order to investigate the neural correlates of moral judgments in either first- or third-person perspective.
Results: Our results indicate that different neural mechanisms appear to be involved in these perspectives. Although
conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, third person-perspective elicited
unique activations in hippocampus and visual cortex. The common activation can be explained by the role the anterior
medial prefrontal cortex may play in integrating different information types and also by its involvement in theory of mind.
Our results also indicate that the so-called "actor-observer bias" affects moral evaluation in the third-person perspective,
possibly due to the involvement of the hippocampus. We suggest two possible ways in which the hippocampus may
support the process of moral judgment: by the engagement of episodic memory and its role in understanding the
behaviors and emotions of others.
Conclusion: We posit that these findings demonstrate that first or third person perspectives in moral cognition involve
distinct neural processes, that are important to different aspects of moral judgments. These results are important to a
deepened understanding of neural correlates of moral cognition—the so-called “first tradition” of neuroethics, with the
caveat that any results must be interpreted and employed with prudence, so as to heed neuroethics “second tradition”
that sustains the pragmatic evaluation of outcomes, capabilities and limitations of neuroscientific techniques and
technologies.
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Studies of moral decision-making have been the focus
of philosophy, psychology, and more recently, the brain
sciences. Examination of the ways that humans (and perhaps
other organisms) engage intent, memory, emotion, and
reasoning processes relevant to their execution and con-
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emphases of sub-disciplines of the cognitive neurosciences,
such as neuroeconomics and more specifically, neuroethics.
Developing from the older fields of moral philosophy
and moral psychology, neuroethics obtains two primary
orientations (or so-called “traditions”). The first can be
somewhat colloquially described as “..the neuroscience of
ethics” [1]. Rather, we offer that a more apt definition of
this branch of neuroethics would be: studies of the putative
neural substrates and mechanisms involved in proto-moral
and moral cognition and behaviors [2-5]. The secondLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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fostered by the use of neuroscience and neurotechnologies
in research, medical practice, or public life.
In this latter regard, particular interest has centered upon
the use of neuroimaging techniques and technologies to
depict, and define neural bases of moral decision-making,
if not “morality”, writ-large–as constituent to ongoing
criticism of neuroimaging, in general [6]. Still, by recogniz-
ing and compensating inherent technical and conceptual
limitations [7] iterative progress in neuroimaging technol-
ogy and method have yielded improvement in outcomes,
which sustain this approach as both valid and valuable to
elucidating the relative activity of various neural networks
in certain types of cognitive tasks and behaviors, including
those involved in moral judgments and behaviors - with
certain caveats noted and acknowledged [8,9].
Such studies have revealed the complexity of these types
of decisions. In the main, focus has shifted from defining
moral judgments as purely cognitive processes (i.e. - reason)
to revealing more emotion-based processes, and recent
results suggest the involvement of both processes in
those decisions that are (both subjectively and objectively
evaluated as being) morally sensitive and/or responsive
[10-15]. What has also become clear is that moral decisions
are not uniformly processed by a particular locus, region or
network [16,17], but rather are more widely distributed
in and across neural fields that are involved in memory,
reward, reinforcement, and punishment, rationalization,
interoception (e.g.- provocation of and response to vari-
ous emotions, self-referentiality, etc.), and behavior. For
example, Young and Dungan [18] suggest that such brain
areas include the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) – in-
volved in emotional processing; posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) and precuneus – both involved in self-referential
processing, the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and/or
somewhat larger fields of Brodmann’s area 39 – that are
involved in aspects of social processing and/ or theory of
mind (ToM).
As well, it is likely that different patterns of neural
network activation may be involved in particular types
of moral decisions, based upon the nature of the evocative
stimuli, situations, and relative involvement of the subject.
In this light, a methodological question has recently been
raised regarding the viability of the rational and emotional/
intuitionist theories of moral cognition and judgments [19].
These research approaches to moral judgment use differ-
ent experimental stimuli: “rationalist” protocols use moral
dilemmas to study moral judgments, while “emotionalist”
protocols employ emotionally-laden statements or pictures
to assess what appear to be moral reactions. Is it possible
that these approaches elicit distinct processes of moral cog-
nition and lead to different results? Monin and colleagues
[19] argue that the focus of reasoning in moral dilemmas
is on the decision-making process - a conflict betweentwo moral constructs and/or principles, whereas moral re-
actions reflect subjects’ emotional responses to particular
stimuli and situations that have moral relevance. Of
note is that moral dilemma protocols are typically pre-
sented in a first person perspective (1PP), while moral
reaction protocols are characteristically presented in a
third-person perspective (3PP). Thus, we question whether
the perspective of the subject(s) toward the moral stimuli
is sufficient to evoke differing effects, and elicit distinct
patterns of neural network activity.
We opine that using stimuli presented in either 1- or
3PP may elucidate a number of potentially interactive
variables that may shed new light on studies of neural
mechanisms and processes of moral cognition. To wit, it
has been shown that different patterns of neural activity
were observed for stimuli presented in either 1- or 3-PP in
non-moral visuospatial tasks [20]. During the 1-PP situ-
ation, neural activity was increased in the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, whereas in the
3-PP situation, neural activity was increased in the medial
superior parietal and right premotor cortex.
Furthermore, differences have also been found in social
non-moral tasks (which appear to reflect theory of mind,
ToM), although these results are somewhat less clear. In a
study on the influence of the person's perspective on ToM,
1- and 3-PP-type sentences elicited different patterns of
neural activation: 1PP-based stimuli yielded greater activa-
tion in the caudate nucleus, while 3PP-based stimuli evoked
increased neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC). The authors related activity in the caud-
ate nucleus to self-focal cognition, and DLPFC-activity to
ToM. Other studies report stronger 3PP activation in the
TPJ and dorsal MPFC [21-24] which are regarded as parts
of the ToM network.
On the other hand, many of these studies have reported
greater activation for the 1PP compared to 3PP in the
MPFC and PCC/ precuneus. Ochsner and colleagues
compared neural processes involved in inferences about
one's own and others emotional states. Concomitant acti-
vation was demonstrated in the MPFC, left inferior PFC,
PCC/ precuneus and STS/ TPJ [25]. This appeared to
reflect recruitment of specific sub-regions in the MPFC,
and additional activation in the medial temporal cortex
for processing self-emotionality, while the lateral PFC
and medial occipital activation appeared to be involved
in processing emotional inferences of/about others. We
posit that these results suggest that "self-judgments" seem
to activate more medial networks, while judgments about
others appear to engage more lateral networks. As well,
components of both networks have some degree of
overlap.
Social psychological studies have repeatedly shown that
negative situations elicit a tendency to attribute one's own
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people's (3PP) behaviors to internal causes, a phenomenon
referred to as the "actor- observer bias" [26,27]. This may
affect results in studies of moral decision-making, given
that many such studies have employed negative situations
as stimuli [28]. Nadelhoffer and Feltz [27] conducted a be-
havioral study of the actor-observer bias using a version of
Philippa Foot’s [29] iconic "trolley problem" as the moral
dilemma stimulus, viz.- a trolley is running out of control
toward five people who are on the track and unaware of
the looming danger. You have the opportunity to save
these five people by throwing a switch and sending the
trolley down a different track. However, if you do this,
you will then kill one individual who is on the second track
(for overview, see also Thomson [30] and for discussion of
relevance to neural bases of moral decision-making, see
Green [31]). The dilemma was presented either in a 1PP
(i.e. - the subject was the actor, actively engaged in throw-
ing the switch to divert the trolley), or in a 3PP (i.e. - the
subject was a passive observer who could tell an actor to
throw the switch). In the actor condition, 65% of the
participants found the action (throwing the switch) to
be permissible, whereas 90% of the participants in the
observer condition found the action to be morally accept-
able. These results imply different psychological processes
involved in the two perspectives.
Thus, differential activation of distinct neural networks
in response to 1PP- or 3PP-based stimuli is expected.
Based on previous studies activation in the medial parts
of the default mode network can be anticipated for the
1PP, and more lateral activation (e.g. DLPFC, TPJ) can be
expected for the 3PP. However, since common activation
for both perspectives has been found in several studies,
and the default mode and ToM networks overlap in
several regions, shared activation may also be expected.
MPFC and PCC/ precuneus seem to be common denomi-
nators for the perspectives. Theoretically, the observer
condition (3PP) of the "actor- observer bias" would tend
to involve attribution of behaviors to internal causes, thus
there is an attempt to understand the mind (i.e. - mental
processes, in this case, the perceived “morality”) of the
"actor". Indeed, ToM has been linked to moral judgments,
and may be seen as important to moral evaluations of the
actions of others [18].
As well, given that (a) most decisions, inclusive of po-
tentially moral judgments involve some degree of Bayesian
processing [32,33]; (b) such processing involves recollec-
tion of circumstance, effect and potential consequences in
orientation to self, others and situations [2,5,34], and (c)
learning and memory have been shown to play significant
roles in these processes [35,36], it is likely that neural
substrates of memory (e.g.- septo-hippocampal networks)
would be involved [37,38]. Studies have fortified this
speculation by demonstrating hippocampal activation intasks involving perception of the emotions and actions
of others [39,40]. Accordingly, we posit that hippocampal
activation (for the 3PP-, as well as perhaps 1PP-situations)
is to be expected. In sum, we hypothesize that the per-
spective of the subject (i.e.- as either actor (1PP), or
observer (3PP)) will evoke differential activity in dis-
tinct neural networks that are putatively involved in
the particular cognitive aspects of these orientations to
moral judgment(s). To test this hypothesis we employed
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare
moral judgments posed in 1- and 3PP-based scenarios.Method
Participants
Sixteen (16) right-handed subjects (9 female, 7 male; mean
age 28.25 years) with normal or corrected to normal vision
participated in this study. Participants had no reported his-
tory of psychiatric or neurological disorder, and were not
using psychoactive drugs at the time of the study. The study
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics Committee and In-
ternal Review Board of the Human Science Center of the
Ludwig-Maximilians University. Active, written informed
consent for participation in the study was obtained from all
participants, and subjects received financial compensation
for their time.Stimulus material
Sixty-nine (69) subjects evaluated 72 moral statements
for valence and arousal in a pre-study. Half of the state-
ments were presented in the 1PP ("I am a cruel person be-
cause I have aggressive thoughts towards my child"), and
half were presented in the 3PP "A person who has aggres-
sive thoughts toward his/ her child is cruel"). To assure
valid comparisons, a five point Likert scale was used to
rate the stimuli for valence, with scores ranging between
−2 (unpleasant) and 2 (pleasant), and arousal, with scores
ranging between −2 (agitating) and 2 (calming). Extreme
values were excluded on an [−1, 1] interval in order to ob-
viate the strongly emotion- laden stimuli, and to compare
similar emotional reactions. Only 8 stimuli remained in
each category after the pre-study. In order to ensure valid
statistical comparisons of valence and arousal, two paired
t-tests were used; there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between stimuli presented in 1PP narrative (M =
−0.82, SD = 0.35) and 3PP narrative (M = −0.82, SD = 0.19),
t (7) = 0.05, p > .05 with respect to valence. There were
also no statistically significant differences between
stimuli presented in 1PP narrative (M = −0.76, SD =
0.30) and 3PP narrative (M = −0.77, SD = 0.22), t (7) =
0.04, p > .05 with respect to arousal. Another paired t-test
was used to control for stimulus sentence length. There
were no statistically significant differences between stimuli
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narrative (M = 10.25, SD = 2.71), t (7) = 1.34, p > .05.
Subjects had to rate the sentences as "right" or "wrong"
by relying upon intuition (i.e.- described to them as “a
gut-feeling”), and not necessarily their real life experience
(s) (e.g. some participants may not have had children), so
as to base their answers upon an "as-if” situation (e.g. If I
were to have aggressive thoughts towards my child - and,
indeed, if I had children - would I be a cruel person?).
Although the stimuli were controlled for length, there
may have been differences in sentence construction. For
example, in the 1PP narrative, "I am a cruel person because
I have aggressive thoughts towards my child", it might seem
that the 3PP narrative that would have been the best match
would be: "John is a cruel person because he has aggressive
thoughts towards his child". However, the actor-observer
bias appears to be more prominent in cases where the actor
is not known - e.g. a stranger [26]. Therefore, we choose
a more abstract expression, namely "a person”. Another
condition was also used, in which participants were asked
to evaluate a non-moral statement based upon their
perception of what they believed to be right or wrong
(e.g. "There are people who are friendly"). An additional,
"scrambled" condition was also used, in which participants
had to push a response button when viewing a sentence
composed of random letters. This condition was employed
to test whether moral judgments activate a similar pattern
when compared to scrambled words as in our previous
study [14] and is not directly related to this study.
All stimuli were presented twice during the fMRI
experiment.
Procedure
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used
in order to study the 1PP and 3PP types of judgments. A
block design was used with 4 conditions (1PP, 3PP, non-
moral, and scrambled) and 8 blocks per condition, each
block comprising 2 stimuli, presented in white, on a black
background. The order of stimuli and blocks was pseudo-
randomized. Subjects viewed the stimuli via a mirror at-
tached to the head-coil on a LCD screen behind the
scanner. Stimuli were presented for 6000 ms (Presentation,
Neurobehavioral Systems, USA), followed by 300 ms
displaying a black screen, which in turn was followed by
a 1000 ms black screen with a white question mark, in
which subjects had to decide whether the statements
could be considered right or wrong by pressing a button
(Cedrus Lumina response box, Cambridge Research Sys-
tems Ltd.). After the two stimuli a black screen was pre-
sented for 6000 ms as a break between blocks. This
method was used to ensure consistent parameters of
cognitive processing in each subject for each presented
stimuli. Given these protocols, reaction time analyses
were not required.The study was conducted with a 3T system (Philips
ACHIEVA, Germany) at the University Hospital LMU
Munich. For anatomical reference, a T1-weighted MPRAGE
sequence was performed (TR = 7.4 ms, TE = 3.4 ms, FA = 8°,
301 sagittal slices, FOV = 240 × 256 mm, matrix = 227 ×
227, inter-slice gap = 0.6 mm). For BOLD imaging, a
T2*-weighted EPI sequence was used (TR = 3000 ms,
TE = 35 ms, FA = 90°, 36 axial slices, slice thickness =
3.5 mm, inter-slice gap = 0 mm, ascending acquisition,
FOV = 230 × 230 mm, matrix = 76 × 77, in-plane reso-
lution = 3 × 3 mm). In total 229 functional volumes were
acquired, 5 being discarded.
Data processing and analysis
The preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed
using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neur-
ology, London, UK). Motion correction, realignment and
spatial normalization were performed in the preprocessing
analysis. Smoothing was executed using a Gaussian ker-
nel of 8 mm FWHM. The four experimental conditions
were modeled by a boxcar function convolved with a
hemodynamic response function. In the first level, several
single-tailed t-contrasts have been calculated for each
subject, condition versus baseline. The individual con-
trast images were used for a random effect analysis in a
second level. A conjunction analysis was performed to
identify positive changes in BOLD signal intensity com-
monly seen in 1PP and 3PP presentations by using contrast
images of each condition compared with the non-moral
condition. Only activations are reported. Group activation
contrasts (uncorrected < .005) were cluster-level corrected
by family wise error (FWE) < .05 with a cluster-size thresh-
old of 50 voxels.
Region of interest (ROI) analysis
Parameter estimates of signal intensity were extracted from
regions of interest (ROIs) for each subject using MARSeille
Boîte À Région d’Intérêt software (MarsBaR v0.42; [43] in
the aMPFC, precuneus, TPJ, and hippocampus, with ROIs
defined as spheres with 10mm radius centered at the peaks
of the parametric activation. Anatomical description was
accomplished by referring to the Automatic Anatomic La-
beling (AAL) [41] atlas from the Wake Forest University
(WFU) Pickatlas (Advanced NeuroScience Imaging Re-
search Laboratory, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA).
Repeated measures analyses of variance with mean beta
values for each subject were done to determine whether
neural activity within these regions differed between 1-
and 3PP moral judgments and the non-moral condition.
Gaussian distribution, homogeneity of variance and covari-
ance and sphericity could be assumed (p > .05). Corrections
for multiple comparisons were done by the Bonferroni pro-
cedure. Statistical analyses calculated with SPSS Statistics
16.0 (IBM, USA).
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Behavioral results
Subjects evaluated the moral statements to be either
morally right, or morally wrong.
A chi-square-test revealed a statistically significant dif-
ference in yes/ no responses for the two moral conditions,
χ2 (1) = 28.96, p < 0.01. The participants found 19% of the
1PP and 51% of the 3PP stimuli to be morally right.
fMRI results
1PP- and 3PP-based judgments were each compared to
the non-moral condition (NM). 1PP-based judgments
yielded greater activation than NM in the anterior medial
prefrontal cortex (aMPFC - BA 10), posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC - BA 23) extending in the precuneus (BA 7),
and temporoparietal junction (TPJ - BA 39) (Table 1,
Figure 1). 3PP-based judgments elicited greater activation in
the aMPFC (BA 10), but also in the lingual gyrus (BA 17),
middle occipital gyrus (BA 18) and hippocampus (Table 1,
Figure 1).
In order to assess overlapping neural activity evoked by
the two judgment modalities, a conjunction analysis was
used. Common activation for the two judgment modalities
(compared to control) was found only in the anterior
medial prefrontal cortex x = 3, y = 59, z = 28 (BA 10; clus-
ter size = 3078 mm3, t = 4.93.).Relative activations were
generated only by the 3PP > 1PP contrast in: hippocampus
bilaterally, and visual cortex - fusiform gyrus (BA 37), mid-
dle occipital gyrus (BA 19), and cuneus (BA 18) (Table 2,
Figure 2). No activations above threshold were observed
in the inversed contrast, 1PP > 3PP.
In order to ensure that the effects were related to the
1PP or 3PP moral conditions, and not due to the subtrac-
tion of the NM condition, the aMPFC, precuneus, TPJ,
and hippocampus were selected for ROI analyses. Over-
all main effects were observed for all ROIs. For aMPFC
(F(2, 30) = 13.17, p < .001, partial η2 = .468), differencesTable 1 Relative activation table: 1- and non 3PP moral judgm
Left
Brain region BA x y z t
1PP > NM
aPFC 10 −6 56 22 5.6
Posterior cingulate cortex 23 −3 −52 31 3.9
Precuneus 7 −3 −58 40 4.9
Temporoparietal junction 39 −42 −55 19 5.2
3PP > NM
aPFC 10 −15 50 37 4.8
Lingual gyrus 18 −33 −85 4 6.6
Middle occipital gyrus −22 −25 −8 4.28 37
Hippocampus 17 6 −82 −5 7.9
Note. BA – aPFC - anterior prefrontal cortex, Brodmann area, x, y, z – MNI coordinatwere found between 1PP and NM condition (p < .002),
and between 3PP and NM conditions (p < .006), but no
difference was found between the two moral conditions
(p = 1). For precuneus (F(2, 30) = 5.22, p < .011, partial
η2 = .258) differences were found between 1PP and NM
condition (p < .038), but none between 3PP and the NM
condition (p = .057) or between the two moral condi-
tions (p = .544). For TPJ (F(2, 30) = 7.29, p < .003, partial
η2 = .327) differences were found between 1PP and NM
condition (p < .003), and between 3PP and NM conditions
(p < .032). No difference was found between the moral
conditions (p = .262). For hippocampus (F(2, 30) = 12.46,
p < .0001, partial η2 = .453) differences were observed
between 1PP- and 3PP conditions (p < .0001), and between
3PP and NM condition (p < .005). However, no difference
was found between NM and 1PP conditions (p = .316)
(Figure 3).
Discussion
The findings bring to light both common and distinct
activations for moral judgments in 1PP and 3PP. A
conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the
aMPFC for both perspectives. When compared to the
non-moral condition, 1PP moral judgments elicited activa-
tion in the aMPFC, PCC extending in the precuneus, and
TPJ, whereas 3PP moral judgments elicited activation in
the aMPFC, hippocampus and visual cortex.
The behavioral results, which revealed that 19% of the
stimuli in 1PP- and 51% of the 3PP- stimuli were evalu-
ated as right, seem to concur with Nadelhoffer and Feltz's
study [27] showing involvement of the “actor-observer
bias”. However, the paucity of imaging research on the
“actor-observer bias“ makes it challenging to describe
the way in which the neurofunctional correlates of the
bias may be contributory to, or form moral judgments.
Even though first and third person perspectives (1PP,
3PP) elicited additional activity (except for aMPFC) inents versus non-moral judgments
Right
mm3 BA x y z t mm3









Figure 1 Neurofunctional correlates of 1- and 3PP moral judgments. (A) 1PP moral judgments versus NM condition, (B) 3PP moral
judgments versus NM condition. Anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex (aMPFC), Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ).
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differences did not withstand the threshold-correction
(except for hippocampus and visual cortex) in the dir-
ect (3PP- vs.1PP; 1PP vs. 3PP-based comparisons). The
findings reveal both common and distinct activations for
moral judgments in 1PP and 3PP. A conjunction analysis
revealed common activation in the aMPFC for both per-
spectives. When compared to the non-moral condition,
1PP moral judgments elicited activation in the aMPFC,
PCC extending in the precuneus, and TPJ, whereas 3PP
moral judgments elicited activation in the aMPFC, hippo-
campus and visual cortex.
No significant statistical differences in signal activation
strength were revealed by the ROI analyses between 1- andTable 2 Relative activation table: 3PP versus 1PP moral judgm
Left
Brain region BA x y z t
Hippocampus −36 −22 −14 4.08
Fusiform gyrus 37 −33 −52 −17 6.05
Middle occipital gyrus 19 −30 −85 16 8.25
Cuneus 18 12 −88 19 4.90
Note. BA – Brodmann area, x, y, z – MNI coordinates.3PP-based presentations in the MPFC, precuneus, and TPJ.
The aMPFC has been shown to be involved in the explicit
representation of both one’s own mental state, and also
the mental states of others [43]. Furthermore, its activity
has been consistently demonstrated in social cognition
and ToM tasks [42]. Moreover, the aMPFC seems to func-
tion in coordination of external and internal stimuli [44].
Theoretically, 1PP presentation should elicit activation
in those areas involved in assessing behavior in a given
situation. When compared to the non-moral condition,
signal activation was elicited in aMPFC, precuneus and
right TPJ. Given that in 81% of the cases the subjects
evaluated the moral stimuli as wrong; it seems that subjects
may have tried to distance themselves from strongents
Right
mm3 BA x y z t mm3
1688 24 −28 −11 5.24 1836
2889 19 24 −70 −14 4.43 1832
2584 19 27 −85 19 4.69 2448
536
Figure 2 Neurofunctional correlates of 3- vs 1PP moral
judgments.
Figure 3 Region of interest analysis: anterior medial prefrontal cortex (
(TPJ). Error bars denote standard error of the mean.
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tivation in the PCC/ precuneus, TPJ, and middle and su-
perior temporal gyrus during emotional-distancing tasks.
Since the aMPFC contributes to the integration of emo-
tion in decision-making and planning [46], activation in
this area suggests that the stimuli may have elicited
emotional processing. An attempt to relate the stimuli
to the self also seems probable, due to activation of the
precuneus, which has been shown to be involved in
types of self-processing (e.g. mental imagery strategies;
[47]). However, these strategies also engage precuneus
perspective-based cognition. Perspective-based cognition
has also been shown to involve the TPJ [48]. That both
the precuneus and TPJ are involved in may suggest
that subjects attempted to change their perspective when
responding to the moral stimuli.
In the 3PP-based condition, subjects appear to evaluate
the behavior of others through the inner characteristics
of the actor, in accordance with the “actor-observer
bias”. Behavioral data suggest that the evaluating standards
were less strict, with 51% of the stimuli being rated as
morally right. When compared to the non-moral condi-
tion neural activation during presentation of moral condi-
tions was found in aMPFC, hippocampus (bilaterally), and
visual cortex. That there was almost equal activation in
the aMPFC for both 1PP- and 3PP presentations of moral
conditions (as based upon ROI analysis) suggests the
involvement of similar processes in these decision events.aMPFC), precuneus, hippocampus, and temporoparietal junction
Avram et al. BMC Neuroscience 2014, 15:39 Page 8 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/15/39Activation in the visual cortex may be explained by
the visual salience of the emotional stimuli presented.
[28,49,50]. Due to dense interconnections between the
visual cortex and the amygdala, a modulating effect
from the amygdala as noted by previous studies seems
possible [51].
Recent neuroimaging studies have related hippocampal
activity to ToM in understanding the emotions and behav-
iors of others [39], specifically as related to the facilitative
role of the hippocampus, and its implication in inducing
and sustaining emotional reactions. Hippocampal activation
may also suggest both a possible role of memories and
projection of self-knowledge while making emotional
judgments regarding others [40] and the viability of declara-
tive memory to integrate relevant information between
different inputs about a given event [52]. However, it has
been suggested that ToM may be independent of episodic
memory [53]. In the present study, the stimuli were not
related to typical daily experiences, but rather, represented
extreme violence, blasphemy, and questionable sexual
behavior.
Therefore, we argue that activation in the 3PP condition
may be dependent upon semantic memory, in that factual
or general information about the world may contribute to
making sense of perceived deviant behavior. Hippocampal
activity has also been shown during tasks of semantic
memory [54], in retrieval of relevant memories [55] that
allow past events to influence present decisions [56].
Taking this into consideration, the presentation of moral
situations may trigger the recollection of memories of re-
lated situational and/or contextual information that relates
to, and could influence present decision-making through
a Bayesian mechanism of ecological observation, orien-
tation and action [2,5,34]. While it might be possible that
the observed hippocampal activation could, perhaps par-
tially, be explained by different conditions relying more or
less on short-term memory, we find it difficult to explain
why the 3PP would rely more on short-term memory
than the 1PP, since there were no statistical significant
differences in assessments of sentence length, valence, or
arousal.
Furthermore, an interaction between the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and hippocampus has been
suggested to mediate cognitive evaluations of the moral
character of others [57]. Emotional salience is attributed
to moral information by the involvement of the vmPFC,
while hippocampal networks involved in memory re-
trieval enable necessary contextual information in order
to make an appropriate character judgment. However,
given that the vmPFC includes at least the ventral part
of Brodmann’s area 10 (BA 10; [58]), and appears to serve
a binding function between aMPFC and the amygdala
[59], we suggest that BA 10 may have a functional role
in integrating emotional information (via enhancedactivation of the visual cortex), and recollective aspects
of the decision-process; (possibly through hippocampal
connections) that are involved in, and/or subserve moral
cognition and judgments.
Thus, we posit that the vmPFC plays a role in emotional
salience, while the aMPFC contributes to synthesizing
the “moral” information, by integrating emotional and
recollective information, thereby enabling appropriate
strategies in moral decision-making. To summarize, we
claim that the involvement of the hippocampus for the
3PP moral judgment can be explained through the results
of recent studies that elucidated its role in understanding
emotions and behaviors of others, while somewhat more
“classical” hippocampal activity (i.e.- memory) plays a role
in the recollection of stored related retrograde situational
or contextual information. We consider the role of the
hippocampus in 3PP moral judgments of crucial import-
ance due to the psychological implications of these func-
tional roles.
There is also a temporal aspect that may be involved,
which would support the “actor-observer bias”. If 1PP
presentations engage evaluative cognition, then such pro-
cessing is temporally related to the present [60,61]. The
3PP situation, however, relies on more abstract evalua-
tions, which tend to be more time independent, in which
inner characteristics of others may come into play. More-
over, if subjects distance themselves from the stimuli used
in 1PP presentations, the time needed to evaluate these
stimuli would be shorter than that needed to evaluate
the stimuli in the 3PP condition, where memory process-
ing would represent an important function in stimuli
assessment.
An important aspect of the present study is the use of
novel stimuli. Since moral dilemmas have already been
used to study the "actor-observer bias" [27] a different
approach, i.e. using moral reactions, may be helpful in
extrapolating the findings. For this reason, control of
emotional valence and duration of stimuli has been en-
sured. Such parameters, however, decrease the number of
stimuli that were used. This may be problematic; however,
due to the novelty of the approach used, a possible limi-
tation in generalization seems suitable in order to gain
greater experimental control over the stimuli.
Despite these limitations, the present findings suggest
that different neural networks may be involved in, and
subserve the perspective one has towards moral situations.
A similar case was found for agency in moral judgments,
for which different associated emotions were found to rely
upon both distinct and overlapping neural substrates
[62]. A psychological component, which could explain the
neural differences found for moral perspective taking, is
the actor-observer bias. Thus, care must be taken when
interpreting neuroimaging studies of the neural bases
of morality, since the perspective of the participants
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In summary, moral stimuli presented in either 1- or 3PP
elicit both distinct (e.g. hippocampus, and visual cortex
for 3PP) and common patterns of neural activation (e.g.
in the self- or ToM networks). These results suggest that
differences may be related to the “actor-observer bias”.
In the 1PP presentation the stimuli were evaluated with
regard to the situation. Since the participants could not
control the situation (although it elicited a strong emotional
response), we posit that subjects may have attempted to
distance themselves from the stimuli by engaging in per-
spective shifting. The 3PP moral judgments seem to have
been evaluated by considering the inner characteristics of
the “actors”, through recollection(s) of relevant informa-
tion and also by engaging in ToM processes.
The overlap in the self- and ToM networks suggests that
self-processing may be a basis through which to experience
complex emotions about others' mental state [39]. These
findings do not imply identical psychological processes for
these different perspectives, and do not contradict the sug-
gested involvement of the “actor-observer bias”. We believe
that the most important implication of this study is related
to distinct mechanisms and processes of moral cognition.
To date, research has posed that networks of the so-called
“moral brain” are homogenously activated, independent
of the eliciting stimuli. This also implies that similar
psychological processes subserve moral cognition and/or
reasoning, irrespective of perception of, or orientation to
the situation [15]. The present results, however, contrast
this view, and suggest that different types of stimuli may
indeed engage distinct types of neural activity and psycho-
logical processing, and that both reflect orientation to the
situation, which may be influenced by a host of factors af-
fecting cognitive biasing, inclusive of cultural differences
and a variety of social effects.
While it has been offered that moral and ethical judg-
ments and actions are “other-based” (see, for example,
MacMurray [63]), it is important to note that any and
all decisions - inclusive of moral judgments (affecting
others) - emanate from, and in many ways are reciprocal
to, and reflective of the self [2,3,5,64-66]. In this light,
potentially moral situations are perceived differently de-
pending upon one’s orientation to, and relative involvement
in the situation and circumstance, and its effect upon prior
experience, past and present reinforcing and rewarding
influences, and predicted outcomes and their impact
upon self and others [67-69].
The results presented here suggest that while there
appears to be something of a core neural network that is
involved in the types of moral decisions rendered in this
study, the spatial and temporal engagement of elements
of this network are peculiar to distinct types and aspects
of situation and circumstances. There are severallimitations of this study. First, the number of stimuli
remaining after the pilot study was rather small. There-
fore, we suggest that future studies employ a larger num-
ber of stimuli. This would also enable non-repetition of
stimuli, thereby avoiding possible learning effects that
have been shown to decrease BOLD signal – e.g. in vis-
ual cortex, PFC etc. [69,70]. Second, it remains some-
what uncertain to what extent participants attributed
external causes to the 1PP, and internal causes to the
3PP, since the subjects were not required to describe
the way in which they evaluated the stimuli. Future
studies could employ a post-scanning interview during
which subjects are asked to explain their decision-making
processes.Conclusion
In conclusion, we opine that the present study suggests
differential patterns and mechanisms of 1PP and 3PP
moral judgments. Such findings have implications for
consideration of how moral decisions are made and
morally-relevant acts are tendered (e.g.- “Good Samaritan”
acts, “by-stander effects”, etc.), and prompt further inquiry
to how patterns of neural activity may affect types and ex-
tent of behaviors in morally-relevant situations, and if and
how such patterns of activity are stable, modifiable, and/or
learned. Yet, we also advocate prudence in interpretation
of these and related findings [2-4,7-9], as the limitations of
fMRI, like any neurotechnology, must be appreciated (see
van Meter [71] for overview).
This encourages engagement of neuroethics’ second
tradition, namely, an analysis of the ways that neuroscience
and neurotechnology are, can, and should be employed to
gain understanding of cognitions, emotions and behaviors,
and how such information is used (in medicine, law and
the public sphere). Indeed, while findings such as those
presented in this study may be provocative, care must
be taken in extrapolating such information to real-world
circumstances, so as to avoid over- or under-estimating
the role of neurobiology in psychological and social activity,
and/or the capabilities of neuroscience and neurotech-
nology to address and answer perdurable and pressing
questions about the “nature” of morality, and other dimen-
sions of cognition, emotion and behavior.
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